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Establishing the Extraterrestrial: Criminal 
Jurisdiction and the International Space 
Station 
A space station will permit quantum leaps in our research . ... We want our 
friends to help us meet these challenges and share in their benefits . ... [We} 
will invite other countries to participate so we can strengthen peace, build 
prosperity, and expand freedom for all who share our goals. I 
With these words, American President Ronald Reagan launched the 
idea of an international space station (ISS) in 1984.2 More than a 
decade of development later, representatives from fifteen of the par-
ticipating partner countries gathered in Washington to sign final agree-
ments for the ISS's development and implementation.3 The new 1998 
In tergovernmen tal Agreemen t on Space Station Cooperation (1998 
Agreement) builds on the 1988 Intergovernmental Agreement (1988 
Agreement) to establish an official legal structure for what National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) head Daniel Goldin 
has called the world's first "city in space."4 Like any other city, the ISS 
presents myriad legal problems and questions, not the least of which 
is where jurisdiction lies for criminal acts committed aboard its eleven 
modules.5 In keeping with the extraordinary emphasis placed on mu-
tual cooperation and prosperity, both the 1988 and 1998 Agreements 
contained provisions cross-waiving liability among the partner coun-
tries for damage to persons, property, and revenue, and stated that 
these provisions were to be broadly construed.6 Previous treaties gov-
1 Ronald Reagan, State of the Union Address, 20 Weekly Compo Pres. Doc. 87, Jan. 25, 1984, 
available in LEXIS, EXEC Library, PRESDC File [hereinafter Reagan]. 
2 See id. 
3 See Toni Marshall, 15 Sign Pact For Space Station, WASH. TIMES, Jan. 30, 1998, at A15. The 
United States, Canada, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, 
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom,Japan, Russia, and Brazil are the official partner 
countries of the ISS project. See International Space Station PartnP1's (visited Feb. 7, 1998) 
<http://station.nasa.gov/partners/index.html>. 
4 See Marshall, supra note 3, at A15. 
5 See Karl-Heinz Bockstiegel, Legal Aspects of Space Stations, 27 COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF 
OUTER SPACE 228, 228 (1984). 
6 See Agreement Among the Government of the United States of America, Governments of 
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erning jurisdiction in outer space have been founded on traditionally 
recognized bases of international jurisdiction.7 But while the criminal 
jurisdiction provisions in the 1988 Agreement's Article 22 followed this 
tradition in part, they also represented a disturbing innovation by as-
signing additional broad-based jurisdiction to the United States (U.S.) 
that was not shared by any partner countries.s The 1998 Agreement's 
Article 22 substantially revises the provisions for criminal jurisdiction 
aboard the ISS, represen ting a return to a more customary under-
standing of international criminal jurisdiction.9 
The relative brevity of Article 22 in both the 1988 and 1998 Agree-
ments, as well as the lack of any concomitant language on civil juris-
diction, indicate the partner countries' mutual feeling that the ISS 
crew will successfully work together in this spirit of cooperation and 
that detailed provisions for judicial recourse are unnecessary.lO It is 
tempting to think that such optimism is justified, and that the ISS 
Ageements truly represent international relations breakthroughs 
whose criminal jurisdiction provisions will never be brought into prac-
tice. However, it may be folly to imagine that if the ISS succeeds, and 
thus forms a prototype for living cities in outer space, the criminal 
jurisdiction provisions it has adopted via the 1988 and 1998 Agree-
ments will be entirely satisfactory. 
This Note will begin in Part I by explaining the history, goals, and 
missions of the ISS, including the involvement of each partner country 
and the philosophical principles characterizing the project as a whole. 
Part II briefly sets out five traditional bases of international jurisdiction 
and explains their relevance to modern international law. Part III 
examines the criminal jurisdiction provisions of the 1988 Agreement's 
Member States of the European Space Agency, the Government of Japan, and the Government 
of Canada on Cooperation in the Detailed Design, Development, Operation, and Utilization of 
the Permanently Manned Civil Space Station, available in 1992 WL 466295, art. 16 [hereinafter 
1988 Agreement]; Agreement Among the Government of Canada, Governments of Member 
States of the European Space Agency, The Government of Japan, the Government of the Russian 
Federation, and the Government of the United States of America on Cooperation in the Detailed 
Design, Development, Operation, and Utilization of the Permanently Manned Civil Space Station, 
art. 16 (visited Feb. 10, 1998) <ftp:/ /ftp.hq.nasa.gov/pub/pao/reports/IGA.html> [hereinafter 
1998 Agreemen t]. 
7 See ANDREW J. YOUNG, LAw AND POLICY IN THE SPACE STATIONS' ERA 152-53 (1989). 
8 See 1988 Agreement, supra note 6, art. 22. 
9 See 1998 Agi'eement, supra note 6, art. 22. 
10 See id.; 1988 Agreement, supra note 6, art. 22. At least one commentator has argued that the 
failure to consider civil tort jurisdiction is a "major omission" in the Agreements, and one that is 
"obviously unacceptable." Hamilton DeSaussure, Tort Jurisdiction Over The New International 
Space Station, 32 COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 305 (1989). 
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Article 22 and explores the ways in which they diverged sharply from 
accepted views of international jurisdiction by assigning the U.S. a 
disproportionate amount of authority. Part IV examines the revised 
criminal jurisdiction provisions of the 1998 Agreement, noting how 
they conform much more closely to accepted bases of international 
jurisdiction and contrasting them with their counterparts in the 1988 
Agreement. Part V argues that although the 1998 Agreement repre-
sents a significant improvement over the 1988 Agreement, it is still not 
a satisfactory answer to the ongoing question of criminal jurisdiction 
in outer space. Finally, Part VI concludes that the best long-term 
solution to the problem of criminal jurisdiction in outer space may be 
an international space agency with the legal power to build from, 
improve, and adjudicate the jurisdictional provisions of Article 22, 
building on the goals and spirit behind the ISS project to ensure that 
continued colonization of space can be legally efficient. 
I. STRUCTURES, FUNCTIONS, CREATORS, AND PHILOSOPHY OF THE ISS 
Since its original conception in 1984, the ISS project has evolved to 
become the largest and most complex cooperative science and engi-
neering program ever attempted. ll It will be the first permanently 
occupied outpost in space, manned by a rotating international crew 
who will conduct commercial and technological research in the major 
areas of microgravity, life sciences, space sciences, and earth science. 12 
When complete, the ISS will consist of eleven pressurized modules, or 
elements: seven will be devoted to research facilities, three will serve 
as crew habitats, and one will provide propulsion, navigation, and 
altitude control. 13 The official partner countries of the ISS project have 
each designated a national agency to implement coordination with the 
other partner countries. 14 These agencies are: 
-The United States: NASA, 
-Canada: Canadian Space Agency, 
II See 15 Countries Sign Agreements On International Space Station, XINHUA ENGLISH NEWSWIRE, 
Jan. 29, 1998, available in 1998 WL 2786604. 
12 See European Ministers and Officials to Sign Space Station Agreements in Washington, M2 
PRESSWIRE, Jan. 29, 1998, available in 1998 \'IlL 5047757; The International Space Station (visited 
Feb. 1, 1998) <http://www.nas.edu/cets/aseb/coss7.html>. 
13 See The International Space Station, supra note 12. 
14 See International Space Station Partners, supra note 3. 
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-Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Nor-
way, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom: European 
Space Agency (ESA) , 
-Japan: National Space Development Agency of Japan, 
-Russia: Russian Space Agency (RSA) , 
-Brazil: Brazilian Space Agency. 15 
The contributions made by each partner country to the develop-
ment of the ISS as a whole are crucial to understanding the problems 
posed by the jurisdiction provisions in Article 22.16 Although the U.S. 
can be credited with the initial idea of the ISS, has provided a good 
deal of the necessary funding for the project, and has been a driving 
force for continued ISS progress, it will only provide two elements: the 
U.S. Laboratory Module, which was successfully launched in Decem-
ber, 1998, and the U.S. Habitation Module, slated to be connected in 
2002,l7 The bulk of ISS elements will come from Russia, whose contri-
butions (and launch dates) include the Russian Service Module (suc-
cessfully attached in space in December, 1998), the Russian Functional 
Cargo Block (1999), two Soyuz-TM vehicles for crew rotation and trips 
between the ISS and Earth (1999), three Russian Research Modules 
(2002), the Russian Life Support Module (2002), and the Russian 
Progress-M vehicle (2002).18 japan's supplied Japanese Experiment 
Module will be sent up in 2000. 19 The European countries' contribu-
tion, the Columbus Orbital Facility research module, is scheduled to 
become part of the ISS in 200J.2° Each country will register the mod-
ules it provides in accordance with the 1976 Convention on Registra-
tion of Objects Launched into Outer Space.21 By the year 2004, all 460 
tons of structures, equipment, modules, and supplies required to com-
plete the ISS will be in orbit around the Earth. 22 
Like the modules comprising its physical structure, the ISS's crew 
will be multinational and multifunctionaJ.23 The entire station will be 
15 See id. 
16 See 1988 Agreement, supra note 6, art. 22; 1998 Agreement, supra note 6, art. 22. 
17 See The International Space Station, supra note 12; Shuttle RetU'rrlS From First Space Station 
Assembly Mission, (visited Jan. 28, 1999) <http://www.cnn.com/TECH/space/981215/shut-
tle.landing> . 
1~ See 1988 Agreement, supra note 6, art. 22; 1998 Agreement, supra note 6, art. 22. 
19 See id. 
20 See id. 
21 See 1998 Agreement, supra note 6, art. 5. 
22 See A Whole New Era in Space Flight (visited Jan. 27, 1999) <http://station.nasa.gov/sta-
tion/index.htm!. 
23 See id. art. 11. 
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roughly the size of a football field, but the areas devoted to living and 
working will make up only a small fraction of this space, therefore, 
each of the seven crew members aboard at any given time must work 
closely with his or her foreign counterparts. 24 Research astronauts on 
the ISS are chosen in accordance with Memoranda of Understanding 
(MOUs) between the partner countries and must conform with the 
ISS's Code of Conduct while aboard. 25 The notion of such a Code of 
Conduct, which is to be developed by all partner countries through 
the MOUs, underscores the goals of the ISS project as a whole by 
formally emphasizing the importance of peaceful cooperation.26 In-
deed, some commentators have noted that the significance of the 
science to be done aboard the ISS is in some ways secondary to its 
more altruistic purposes and the evolving international values it rep-
resents.27 
The foreign policy goals of the ISS project, as articulated by Presi-
dent Reagan in 1984, are appropriately lofty for an enterprise of such 
scope and creativity: strengthening peace, building prosperity, and 
expanding freedom for all partner countries involved.28 Similarly grand 
ideals have continued to find expression in the speeches and publica-
tions of the partner countries. 29 NASA, via its official ISS web site, 
24 See Michael Braukus & Susan Povenmire, Space Station Agreements To Be Signed In Washington 
(visited Feb. 7, 1998) <http://station.nasa.gov/news/pressrel!98-017.txt>; The International 
Space Station, supra note 12. 
25 See 1988 Agreement, supra note 6, art. 11. 
26 See id. The Code of Conduct has not yet been formalized, though several MOU's between 
the partner countries are currently in force and cover issues of crew behavior and treatment. See, 
e.g., Memorandum of Understanding Between the National Aeronautics and Space Administra-
tion of the United States of America and the Russian Space Agency Concerning Cooperation on 
the Civil International Space Station, art. 11 (visited Feb. 10, 1998) <ftp:/ /ftp.hq.nasa.gov/pub/ 
pao/reports/nasaJussian.html>; Memorandum of Understanding Between the National Aero-
nautics and Space Administration of the Unites States of America and the European Space Agency 
Concerning Cooperation on the Civil International Space Station, art. 11 (visited Feb. 10, 1998) 
<ftp:/ /ftp.hq.nasa.gov/pub/pao/reports/nasa_esa.html>; Memorandum of Understanding Be-
tween the National Aeronautics and Space Administration of the Unites States of America and 
the Canadian Space Agency Concerning Cooperation on the Civil International Space Station, 
art. 11 (visited Feb. 10, 1998) <ftp://ftp.hq.nasa.gov/pub/pao/reports/nasa_csa.html>. 
27 See Eric B. Schoch, The Next Step In Space, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Feb. 1, 1998, at Dl; Tony 
Reichhardt, Science Struggles To Gain Respect On The Space Station, NATURE, Feb. 17, 1998, at 732. 
28 See Reagan, supra note 1. 
29 See International Space Station Fact Book, A New Era Of Peacefid Cooperation (visited Feb. 7, 
1998) <http://station.nasa.gov/reference/factbook/coop.html>; Patrick Worsnip, Space Station 
Accord Marhs New Era, GLASGOW HERALD, Jan. 31, 1998, at 13; Remarks Made At Signing Session 
Of The International Space Station Partner'S Agr-eement (visited Feb. 7, 1998) <http://www.state. 
gov /www/global!oes/space/980129_space_agreemen Lhtml> [hereinafter Remadls at Signing]. 
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claims that the ISS "serves as a symbol of the power of nations to work 
together" and "offers a test case for building mutual trust and shared 
goals. "30 Minister Ronald Duhamel of Canada called it "the celebration 
of cooperation among nations for the benefit of humankind," and 
Belgium's Yvan Ylieff, Chairman of the ESA's Ministerial Level Council, 
noted that "the cooperation on the international space station will 
enhance the scientific, technological and economic development of all 
the partners involved" in addition to strengthening "the close ties 
existing not only among the governments, but also between the peo-
ples of Europe, North America, Russia and Japan. "31 
II. TRADITIONAL BASES OF CRIMINAL JURISDICTION IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 
A precise definition of jurisdiction in the international context is 
extremely difficult to formulate. 32 Broadly speaking, the interests of 
sovereign nations in obtaining and maintaining jurisdiction over their 
nationals, their territory, and acts that affect their broader welfare have 
been widely recognized as bases for traditional criminal jurisdiction 
in international law. 33 In order to serve these interests without imping-
ing on any nation's sovereignty, the world community has generally 
adopted four theories of international criminal jurisdiction: subjec-
tive/ objective territoriality, nationality theory, the protective principle, 
and the doctrine of universal interest.34 
Territorial principles of jurisdiction are rooted in the notion that 
sovereign countries are defined in large part by the territory that 
comprises them, the basis of sovereign ty itself. 35 Jurisdiction based on 
subjective territoriality is accorded to a sovereign nation over any 
criminal offense committed in its territory.36 The rationale for this type 
of jurisdiction is perhaps the easiest to recognize: nations have a pri-
mary interest in maintaining internal peace and security, and thus they 
rightfully possess jurisdiction over every person and every act within 
30 International Space Station Fact Booh, A New Era Of Peaceful Cooperation, supra note 29. 
31 Remarhs at Signing, supra note 29. 
32 See E. Kamenetskaya, Large Space Stations: Some Problems of jurisdiction, 27 COLLOQUIUM ON 
THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 254,254 (1984). 
33 See COVEY T. OLIVER ET AL., THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM 133-35 (4th ed. 1995). 
34 See id. at 132. 
35 See YOUNG, supra note 7, at 152. 
36 See OLIVER ET AL., supra note 33, at 135. 
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their borders.37 This interest is sufficiently strong that a nation may 
obtain jurisdiction even if only one element of an offense constituting 
a crime takes place within its territory.38 Virtually every country utilizes 
this principle.39 Objective territoriality seeks to protect the same inter-
ests as subjective territoriality, but its reach is slightly broader: a nation 
may exercise jurisdiction over conduct outside its territory that causes 
an effect therein.40 
Under the nationality theory, a sovereign nation has jurisdiction over 
the activities of its nationals regardless of their location.41 This basis of 
jurisdiction is founded both in the notion that the nationals of a 
country owe it allegiance even when they are outside its boundaries 
and in the concept that a sovereign nation must exercise responsibility 
for the acts of its citizens in the world as a whole. 42 It derives from the 
old Roman notion that "one's law travels with him," and is particularly 
important to civil law jurisdictions, where the honor of the country is 
perceived to be at stake when nationals commit offenses abroad.43 A 
sovereign nation may extend this basis by ascribing nationality to cor-
porations, vessels, and aircraft; they then become subject to its jurisdic-
tion precisely as individuals would.44 Additionally, some sovereign na-
tions have tried to obtain jurisdiction based on the nationality of the 
crime victim.45 This is known as the passive personality principle.46 
Although the principle makes sense intuitively-a sovereign nation 
clearly has an interest in protecting its nationals, and in ensuring that 
perpetrators of crimes against them are brought to justice-it has not 
been universally accepted, and many nations including the U.S. have 
tended to reject it as a basis for jurisdiction.47 
The third main basis of international jurisdiction is the protective 
principle.48 This principle is something of an exception to territoriality 
theories: it provides jurisdiction over offenses committed wholly out-
37 See GLENN H. REYNOLDS & ROBERT P. MERGES, OUTER SPACE: PROBLEMS OF LAW AND POLICY 
248 (1989). 
38 See OLIVER ET AL., supra note 33, at 137. 
39 See id. 
40 See id. 
41 See YOUNG, supra note 7, at 152. 
42 See id. 
43 OLIVER ET AL, supra note 33, at 165. 
44 See id. at 166. 
45 See YOUNG, supra note 7, at 152. 
46 See id. 
47 See id. 
48 See OLIVER ET AL.., supra note 33, at 171. 
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side the sovereign nation's territory, but only applies to offenses that 
cause or threaten to cause adverse effects on the country's security, 
integrity, or sovereignty.49 Some commentators have criticized the pro-
tective principle for being overbroad because it allows jurisdiction over 
conduct that merely poses a potential threat to interests of the nation 
in question.50 However, the fact that its applicability is limited to rec-
ognized and limited interests (the security or integrity of the nation) 
may help to reduce the danger of overreaching. 51 
Universal interest, the final basis of international criminal jurisdic-
tion, is distinct from the others in that the sovereign nation exercising 
it need not have a direct connection to the criminal conduct being 
tried.52 This type of jurisdiction applies only to certain crimes that have 
been condemned by the domestic laws of virtually all civilized nations 
and that are violative of international laws: piracy, hijacking, genocide, 
slave trading, apartheid, and war crimes.53 Such offenses trigger an 
obligation either to prosecute or to extradite the accused.54 The basic 
notion underlying universal interest jurisdiction is that crimes of this 
nature are sufficiently serious that all nations have an equal interest in 
prosecuting them, and so any convenient forum may be utilized for 
that purpose.55 
III. ARTICLE 22 OF THE 1988 AGREEMENT-GOING Too FAR 
Like the high seas, to which it is perhaps the closest jurisdictional 
analogue, outer space is not considered to be under the exclusive 
control of any earthly nation.56 However, like ships at sea, objects 
launched into space can be registered by their creating nations in 
49 See id. 
50 See id. 
51 See id. 
52 See REYNOLDS & MERGES, supra note 37, at 248-49. 
53 See OLIVER ET AL., supra note 33, at 177-78. 
54 See id. at 177. 
55 See id. Interesting cases of universal interest jurisdiction include those dealing with World 
War II genocide crimes and the Nuremberg principles. In Attorney General of Israel v. Eichmann, 
for example, the Israel Supreme Court found that it had jUlisdiction ovel' an accused war criminal 
because of the nature of his involvement with the Nazi regime even though the state of Israel 
was not in existence when the alleged crimes were committed. 36 Int'l L.Rep. 277 (Israel S. Ct. 
1968). 
56 See Hamilton DeSaussure & Melissa S. Ulrich, Transition of Control and jurisdiction Over Space 
Settlements, 34 COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 56, 56 (1991); Ty S. Twibell, Space 
Law: Legal Restraints on Commercialization and Development of Outer space, 65 UMKC L. REv. 589, 
594 (1997). 
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accordance with the 1967 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities 
of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space; these nations then 
retain jurisdiction over the registered spacecraft. 57 Since the ISS is 
constructed of elements registered in several different partner coun-
tries, the 1988 Agreement provided that registration need not be the 
sole or even chief means of establishing jurisdiction over any element. 58 
Instead, the Agreement focused on the origin of each element and the 
nationality of the personnel to determine which partner country had 
jurisdiction over an offense committed aboard the ISS.59 
This approach was solidly rooted in the traditional jurisdictional 
bases of territoriality and nationality, and therefore made sense as an 
initial attempt to address criminal jurisdiction in outer space.60 How-
ever, the 1988 Agreement went further, creating a wholly new jurisdic-
tional right for the U.S. alone. Gl This provision was unfounded in any 
standard of international jurisdiction, and represented a dangerous 
precedent for partisan interests on the ostensibly shared ISS.62 
Under the 1988 Agreement, signatory partner countries were 
granted criminal jurisdiction over "the flight elements they respectively 
provide" and "over personnel in or on any flight element who are their 
respective nationals."63 It is easy to understand these provisions in light 
of customary jurisdictional bases. Giving partner countries criminal 
jurisdiction over the elements they built and provided to the ISS was 
the functional equivalent of permitting them to exercise jurisdiction 
over their own territory.64 Hence, this provision was easily analogized 
to the earthbound doctrine of subjective territoriality.65 
Additional support for these grants came from the nationality theory 
of international jurisdiction.66 A partner country maintains its interest 
in the activities of its nationals regardless of their location; though 
traditional theorists may not have had outer space specifically in mind, 
it is clear that a nation retains concern for its citizens even if they have 
left the planet.67 Thus, the grant of jurisdiction over personnel who 
57 See YOUNG, supra note 7, at 153. 
58 See 1988 Agreement, supra note 6, art. 22. 
59 See id. 
60 See OLIVER ET AL., supra note 33, at 135, 165-66. 
61 See 1988 Agreement, supra note 6, art. 22. 
62 See id. 
63 [d. § 1. 
f>4 See OLIVER ET AL., supra note 33, at 137. 
65 See id. 
66 See id. at 165. 
67 See id. 
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were nationals anywhere aboard the ISS made good sense.68 Similarly, 
a partner country could ascribe its nationality to the ISS elements it 
owned and provided.69 Those modules would then be subject to the 
ascribing country's jurisdiction just as ships or aircraft of ascribed 
nationality would be, and thus a basis for criminal jurisdiction in a 
location not owned by any sovereign nation would be satisfactorily 
established.70 
The basic criminal jurisdiction provision of the 1988 Agreement, 
therefore, was solidly founded on customary territorial and national 
bases for international jurisdiction.71 Such principles were familiar to 
all the signatory partner countries, each of which was large and sophis-
ticated enough to be familiar with the complexities of international 
jurisdiction issues.72 Given the eminent sensibility of this first provision, 
the second-which essentially gave an extra grant of jurisdiction to the 
U.S. even if no threat to U.S. security interests existed-is difficult to 
understand or defend from any traditional perspective.73 The pertinen t 
text of the Agreement gave the U.S. an exclusive right to "exercise 
criminal jurisdiction over misconduct committed by a non-U.S. na-
tional in or on a non-U.S. element of the manned base or attaching 
to the manned base which endangers the safety of the manned base 
of the crew members thereon" as long as it first consulted with the 
miscreant's national partner country and obtained either concurrence 
of that partner state in continuing prosecution or else failed to receive 
assurances that the partner state intended to prosecute on its own 
behalf.74 
The blanket grant to the U.S. of jurisdictional power over non-U.S. 
nationals and the acts they might commit aboard non-U.S. modules 
did not fit with nationality or territorial theories of jurisdiction; in fact, 
it could be read as flatly contradicting them.75 If the clause had limited 
extra U.S. jurisdiction to those cases where the victim of the offense 
was a U.S. national, it might have been rationalized as an application 
of the passive personality principle.76 However, the U.S. has tended to 
68 See id. 
69 See 1988 Agreement, supra note 6, art. 6. 
70 See OLIVER ET AL., supra note 33, at 166. 
71 See id. at 137, 165-66; 1988 Agreement, supra note 6, art. 22. 
72 See OLIVER ET AL., supra note 33, at 166. 
73 See 1988 Agreement, supra note 6, art. 22. 
74 See id. 
75 See OLIVER ET AL., supra note 33, at 137, 165-66. 
76 See id. at 168. 
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reject this basis of international jurisdiction, and in any case the lan-
guage did not contain such a limitation.77 Nor was the additional 
jurisdiction given to the U.S. under Article 22 explicable in terms of 
the protective principle or universal interest.78 Nothing in Article 22 
limited the U.S.'s extra jurisdiction to offenses that directly threatened 
American security, integrity, or sovereignty, so no direct invocation of 
the protective principle existed.79 The U.S. was simply to have addi-
tional criminal jurisdiction over any offense committed by anyone 
anywhere aboard the ISS-this would include hijacking and piracy, 
both of which fall under universal interest, but it was not limited to 
such offenses and therefore could not be read as resting on this base.80 
Since it was without roots in any customary base of international 
criminal jurisdiction, the additional blanket grant given to the U.S. by 
Article 22 represented a disturbing and dangerous departure from 
tradition, while simultaneously giving broad unilateral discretion to the 
U.S. as to whether it would become involved with any ISS criminal 
offenses that interested it.8) Some comfort might have been taken from 
the clause indicating that the U.S. must consult with the partner coun-
try in question before proceeding with prosecution.82 But this reading 
was not persuasive in light of the next clause, which gave unprece-
dented jurisdiction back to the U.S. if it "failed to receive assurances" 
that the partner state would undertake prosecution itself.83 There was 
no indication of what might constitute such "assurances," and it is 
significant that the language turned on the U.S.'s failure to "receive" 
them rather than on the partner country's failure to "provide" them.84 
This wording presumptively left the central question of whether assur-
ance was provided to the discretion of the U.S.85 Even if a partner 
country gave what it considered to be more than adequate assurance 
that it would prosecute its accused national, the U.S. remained in an 
77 See id.; 1988 Agreement, supra note 6, art. 22. 
78 See 1988 Agreement, supra note 6, art. 22; OLIVER ET AL., supra note 33, at 171, 177. 
79 See 1988 Agreement, supra note 6, art. 22. 
80 See 1988 Agreemen t, supra note 6, art. 22; OLIVER ET AL., supra note 33, at 178. The same 
argument would theoretically apply to the universal interest crimes of apartheid, genocide, and 
slave trading, but it would be virtually impossible for such offenses to be committed aboard the 
ISS in the first place. See 1988 Agreement, supra note 6, art. 22; OLIVER ET AL., supra note 33, at 
178. 
81 See 1988 Agreement, supra note 6, art. 22. 
82 See id. 
83 [d. art. 22, § 2(b)(2). 
84 [d. 
85 See id. 
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Agreement-supported position to claim it had not received proper 
assurance, and could confidently continue any attempts to exercise 
its own jurisdiction.86 There was (and still is) no intergovernmental 
agency with the power to resolve conflicts over questions raised by the 
Agreement or over events occurring aboard the ISS itself.87 Hence, the 
U.S. was assigned and retained ultimate additional criminal jurisdic-
tion with no traditional basis, and faced no outside intervention if it 
chose to exercise its exclusive power.88 
IV. ARTICLE 22 OF THE 1998 AGREEMENT: REVISING TOWARDS 
REASONABLENESS 
Over the decade between the 1988 and 1998 Agreements, the ISS 
project as a whole underwent significant diplomatic developments.89 
Critical among these was the addition of Russia to the list of participat-
ing partner countries.90 Due to its ongoing experience with the space 
station Mir, the RSA has been able to lend a huge amount of expertise 
to the ISS project.91 It is safe to assume that without the RSA's assis-
tance, the ISS would be nowhere near meeting its proposed schedule, 
and that its technological capabilities as well as its functionality would 
be at significantly lower levels.92 By agreeing to cooperate with Russia 
on the ISS, the U.S. unquestionably expanded the possibilities of the 
project and achieved a breakthrough in U.s.-Russian relations follow-
ing the end of the Cold War; as Russian Ambassador Yuli Vorontsov 
stated: 
Way back in the past will stay the times of rivalry and jockey-
ing for all kind of the first places in space. Russia is investing 
in the project her achievements and unique experience of 
man's space flights and laboratories. We hope that they will 
act as guarantors of a successful construction of the interna-
tional space station.93 
86 See id. 
87 See CARL Q. CHRISTOL, SPACE LAw; PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE 200 (1991). 
88 See 1988 Agreement, supra note 6, art. 22. 
89 See Remarks at Signing, supra note 29. 
90 See id. 
91 See id. 
92 See id. 
93 See id. 
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However, once Russia became involved, the U.S. ceased to be the 
clearly dominant partner in terms of expertise and equipment pro-
vided.94 The 1998 Agreement reflects this changed power structure: in 
the completely revised Article 22, the extra jurisdiction granted to the 
U.S. was excised and replaced with much more precise and egalitarian 
language based on recognized principles of international criminal 
jurisdiction. % 
Under the 1998 Agreement, partner countries retain the right of 
jurisdiction over their nationals anywhere aboard the ISS."6 As in the 
1988 Agreement, this provision is a clear expression of traditional na-
tionality jurisdiction.97 However, the 1998 Agreement no longer grants 
partner countries jurisdiction over the elements they provide to the 
ISS."8 This revision may reflect the spirit of international cooperation 
so much alluded to by the partner countries' diplomats: if the ISS is 
really a cooperative venture, and the crew is to move freely about the 
station and use all parts of it to conduct multinational experiments, it 
makes little sense to differentiate the sponsorship of each element 
merely for the purposes of criminal jurisdiction.99 
In addition to standard nationality theory, the 1998 Agreement's 
Article 22 depends heavily on the doctrine of passive personality for 
establishing criminal jurisdiction. lUI! According to the new language, a 
partner country may, under certain circumstances, exercise criminal 
jurisdiction over an offense committed aboard the ISS that "affects the 
life or safety of' one of its nationals, regardless of the perpetrator's 
nationality.lOl Passive personality, though not usually accepted as a 
jurisdictional basis by the U.S., has experienced a resurgence of popu-
larity in Europe since the mid-20th century.lU2 Those defending it as a 
basis for international criminal jurisdiction argue that since the essen-
tial object of criminal law is to protect the public interest, the victim's 
national law and justice system provide the best appreciation of pre-
cisely what protection should be affordedYJ3 This argument militates 
94 See The International Space Station, supm note 12. 
95 See 1998 Agreement, supm note 6, art. 22. 
96 See id. 
97 See OLIVER ET AL., supm note 33, at 165. 
98 Compare 1998 Agreement, sllpm note 6, art. 22, with 1988 Agreement, supm note 6, art. 22. 
99 See Remarks at Signing, supra note 29. 
100 See 1998 Agreement, supra note 6, art. 22. 
IOlld. 
102 See OLIVER ET AL., supra note 33, at 168. 
IO~ See id. 
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strongly against the type of blanket jurisdiction granted to the U.S. by 
the 1988 Agreement, and its appeal is clear: a country whose national 
has been the victim of a given criminal offense has a strong interest in 
the case, whereas the U.S., who (under the 1988 Agreement) could 
have chosen to become involved in any offense committed, might well 
lack any connection to that offense in terms of nationals and prop-
erty. \04 
Because it provides for jurisdiction based on both nationality and 
passive personality, the 1998 Agreement contains (as it must) clauses 
describing how jurisdictional conflicts of interest are to be settled. 105 
According to the new Article 22, the partner country of the alleged 
perpetrator must consult with the partner country of the alleged victim 
at the latter's request to discuss their respective prosecutorial inter-
ests. IOG Following such a consultation, the victim's nation may choose 
to exercise jurisdiction if the alleged perpetrator's nation concurs in 
that exercise or fails, within 90 days, to "provide assurances that it will 
submit the case to its competent authorities for purposes of prosecu-
tion."107 
There are two major shifts in this provision that differ from the 1988 
Agreement and that are worth noting. 108 The first is the requirement 
that the two partner countries involved in the dispute consult with one 
another, a precondition that was noticeably absent from the 1988 
Agreement's grant of extra jurisdiction to the U.S.1U9 This change is 
consonant with the new spirit of international trust and cooperation 
concerning the ISS project as a whole, and is further codified later in 
Article 22 with the provision that each partner state shall, "subject to 
its national laws and regulations, afford the other [p] artners assistance 
in connection with alleged misconduct on orbit."11O 
The second important change in the 1998 Agreement's language is 
the shift from the U.S.'s failure to "receive" assurances of prosecution 
(1988) to the concerned partner country's failure to "provide" them 
104 See 1988 Agreement, supra note 6, art. 22. 
105 See id. 
106 See id. § 2. 
107Id. § 2(2). 
108 See id., art. 22; 1998 Agreement, supra note 6, art. 22. 
109 See 1998 Agreement, supra note 6, art. 22; 1988 Agreement, supra note 6, art. 22. 
110 1998 Agreement, supra note 6, art. 22, § 4; see generally Remarks at Signing, supra note 29. 
This provision manages to strike a nice balance between guaranteeing bilateral communication 
and respecting each partner country's particular laws and regulations. See 1998 Agreement, supra 
note 6, art. 22, § 4. 
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(1998), in cases where the partner country exercising jurisdiction is 
not that of the perpetrator. lIl Balancing the requirement on the side 
of the receiver has several negative implications. ll2 Under the 1988 
. Agreement, the U.S. could invoke its jurisdiction merely by claiming it 
had not received any assurances that the partner country involved 
intended to prosecute; no evidence could really be required, as it 
would be impossible to prove that something was never received. 1I3 
However, the nation of an alleged perpetrator might well be able to 
show that it provided assurances to the victim's partner country via 
some kind of physical proof: copies of memos sent, recordings of 
conversations held, and so forth.114 Shifting the burden from receiver 
to provider therefore continues the move towards fairness and equality 
that marks the 1998 Agreement's Article 22.115 
Also new in the 1998 Agreemen t, and reflective of more thoughtful 
draftsmanship, is a provision concerning extradition. l16 Generally, an 
obligation to prosecute or extradite is triggered when the crime in 
question is one that would come under the jurisdictional nexus of 
universal interest. ll7 However, the new Article 22 provides for extradi-
tion of an alleged perpetrator without limiting its coverage to hijack-
ing, piracy, or any of the other universal interest crimes.ll8 Further-
more, the language of the 1998 Agreement makes it possible for 
extradition to occur even in situations where the requesting and re-
quested country have no separate extradition treaty; under such cir-
cumstances, the countries involved may "consider this Agreement as 
the legal basis for extradition in respect of the alleged misconduct on 
orbit."119 This provision is an interesting extension of the universal 
interest doctrine and makes sense in the context of outer space. More-
over, it indicates a willingness by the partner countries to let new space 
treaties override traditional arrangements; agreeing that the fledgling 
1998 Agreement may be used in place of customary extradition trea-
ties, which were formerly necessary in many of the partner countries 
111 See 1998 Agreement, supra note 6, art. 22; 1988 Agreement, supra note 6, art. 22. 
112 See supra part II. 
113 See 1988 Agreement, supra note 6, art. 22. 
114 See 1998 Agreement, supra note 6, art. 22. 
115 See id. 
116 See id. § 3. 
117 See OLIVER ET AL., supra note 33, at 177. 
liS See 1998 Agreement, supra note 6, art. 22, § 3. 
119Id. 
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(including the V.S.), demonstrates a deep commitment to mutual 
cooperation and genuine desire to make the ISS project successful. l20 
Taken as a whole, the newly revised version of Article 22 appears to 
reflect a significant shift in V.S. attitude towards the ISS project. l2l 
Compromises such as forfeiting its extra grant of criminal jurisdiction, 
permitting the use of the passive personality principle as a base for 
international jurisdiction, and agreeing to substitute the 1998 Agree-
ment for extradition treaties in cases where none exist may indicate 
the V.S.'s willingness to negotiate previously key aspects of its foreign 
policy in order to further the interests of the ISS.122 The Clinton 
administration (1992-2000), reaffirming its commitment to the ISS, 
released a comprehensive new National Space Policy in 1996 designed 
to "ensure America's role as the world's space leader."123 The 1998 
Agreement demonstrates a new American understanding: in order to 
be one of the leaders in space exploration, the V .S. will have to work 
closely with other giants like Russia and the ESA, yielding its attitude 
of superiority and perks like unlimited extra jurisdiction in the proc-
ess. 124 
v. THE LIMITATIONS OF LANGUAGE: ACHIEVEMENTS AND 
SHORTCOMINGS OF THE 1988 AND 1998 AGREEMENTS 
Although the ISS is currently the world's most developed space 
colonization project, it is by no means the end of the quest for extra-
terrestrial outpostS.125 Plans to establish manned colonies on the moon 
and Mars have been in developmen t for many years, reflecting a per-
ception that human expansion into space will foster long-term growth 
and wealth creation as well as global security.126 With such growth will 
come a host of legal, administrative, and political problems. While 
criminal jurisdiction may not be the first or most pressing of these 
120 See OLIVER ET AL., supra note 33, at 217. 
121 See 1998 Agreement, supra note 6, art. 22. 
122 See id. 
123 President Issues New National Space Policy, available in 1996 WL 533618, *1 (White House), 
Sept. 20, 1996. Some scholars argue that the U.S.'s self-perceived preeminence in space ventures 
is largely fictional: Russia's Mir program is perhaps the best-known space experiment, and the 
majority of commercial contracts in outer space are awarded to the ESA and some Third World 
countries. See Twibell, supra note 56, at 591. 
124 See 1998 Agreement, supra note 6, art. 22; Remarks at Signing, supra note 29. 
125 See Space Age Associates Events Preview Page (visited Mar. 1, 1998) <http://www.astronist.de-
mon.co.ukj saa20.html>. 
126 See id. 
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issues, it has nevertheless attracted the attention of many space law 
scholars and been the focus of several colloquia. 127 Article 22 of the 
1988 and 1998 Agreements therefore bears close scrutiny as a possible 
prototype for future criminal jurisdiction provisions in outer space, 
which will have to be based on similar international principles if they 
are to provide satisfactory guidance in this yet-uncharted field. 128 How-
ever, the gaping holes in the 1988 and 1998 Agreements indicate that 
international treaties cannot, in and of themselves, serve as the basis 
for criminal jurisdiction in outer space as the human presence there 
increases. 129 No single nation can or should be given the type of author-
ity granted to the U.S. by the 1988 Agreement-and yet there is a need 
for a centralized authoritative body with the power to address the issues 
raised by space exploration and conquest. 130 Such an agency, working 
from the principles informing the 1988 and 1998 Agreements, seems 
the best way to ensure that criminal jurisdiction over all future space 
settlements and outposts is assigned in an equitable fashion. 131 
Although some provisions of the 1988 Agreement's Article 22 were 
rooted in traditional theories of territoriality and nationality, the extra 
criminal jurisdiction granted by it to the U.S. was not based on any 
customary ground and would arguably have been catastrophic as a pro-
totype for future treaties.132 Future space stations and eventual settle-
ments on the moon and Mars are almost certain to be international 
projects, developed and implemented by several partner countries 
acting in cooperation; the U.S. is not the most advanced of the space-
faring nations, and will need to work closely with the RSA and ESA 
(at the very least) to build on the knowledge gained during the ISS 
experiment. 133 Granting the U.S. the type of blanket jurisdiction de-
scribed in Article 22 of the 1988 Agreement would have created great 
confusion, particularly given the significant differences in criminal 
procedure between the common law American system and the civil law 
127 See, e.g., DeSanssure & Ulrich, supra note 56, at 55-58; Charles Chukwuma Okolie, Interna-
tional Law Principles of jurisdiction in Regard to Settlements of Humankind on the Moon and Mars, 
34 COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 64-69 (l991);Jan Ondrej, Problems of jurisdiction 
in Connection with Settlements on the Moon and MaTS, 34 COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER 
SPACE 71-73 (1991). 
128 See Okolie, supra note 127, at 65. 
129 See 1988 Agreement, supra note 6, art. 22; 1998 Agreement, supra note 6, art. 22. 
130 See CHRISTOL, supra note 87, at 200; DeSanssnre & Ulrich, supra note 56, at 57. 
m See CHRISTOL, supra note 87, at 200; DeSaussure & Ulrich, supra note 56, at 57. 
m See 1988 Agreement, supra note 6, art. 22. 
133 See Knnt Focke, International Cooperation in Space: Legal Aspects for the Future, 33 COLLO-
QUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE J 92, 193 (1990); Twibell, supra note 56, at 591. 
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systems of most partner countries. 134 It would also have created a 
serious imbalance of power between the U.S. and other partner coun-
tries, thus going against the unique cooperative spirit established by 
the ISS participants and giving the U.S. a negative, power-grabbing 
image. m Clearly, revisions needed to be made-and, as major powers 
like Russia became part of the ISS project, they were. 130 
Article 22 of the 1998 Agreement represents a vast improvement on 
its 1988 predecessor. I37 In the 1998 version, criminal jurisdiction pro-
visions are solidly based on customary principles of nationality and the 
protective principle, the matter of extradition is addressed, and the 
spirit of mutual cooperation and open discussion is codified for the 
first time. 13s The 1998 Agreement's Article 22 also contains language 
acknowledging the need for further development in the areas of mis-
conduct and order maintenance aboard the ISS.139 A separate Code of 
Conduct, described elsewhere in the Agreement, is to be authored and 
signed by the partner countries to govern the behavior of ISS crew 
members.140 Such an admission that more agreements will be needed 
demonstrates a continuing commitment to cooperation by the ISS 
partner countries, but it also reflects the ongoing question of whether 
any treaty, even one as carefully drafted and important as the 1998 ISS 
Agreement, can be anything more than an initial framework for creat-
ing and maintaining codes of criminal jurisdiction over outer space 
activities. 141 Language like that of the 1988 and 1998 Agreements is too 
134For a general overview of the differences in criminal procedure between civil and common 
law countries, see RUDOLF B. SCHLESINGER ET AL., COMPARATIVE LAW 473-80 (5th ed. 1988). 
135 See Remmks at Signing, supra note 29. 
136 See 1998 Agreement, supra note 6, art. 22; 1988 Agreement, supra note 6, art. 22; Remarks 
at Signing, supra note 29. 
137 See 1998 Agreement, supra note 6, art. 22; 1988 Agreement, supra note 6, art. 22; Remarks 
at Signing, supra note 29. 
138 See 1998 Agreement, supra note 6, art. 22. 
139 See id. § 5. 
140 See 1998 Agreement, supra note 6, art. 11. 
141 See 1998 Agreement, supra note 6, art. 22, § 5; Focke, supra note 133, at 193-94. It could 
be argued that criminal jurisdiction over the ISS is not really a matter of concern because of the 
small likelihood that any of the ISS's carefully handpicked crew members, who are admitted to 
the program only after rigorous training and who are fully aware that they represent their nation 
under the scrutiny of the world, would commit a criminal offense while aboard. But while this 
argument may be convincing in its immediate application, it ignores the logical continuation of 
the ISS: future space stations, which will be more complex and require more crew members, and 
eventual civilian settlements on the moon and Mars. See Space Age Associates Events Preview Page, 
supra note 125. 
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vague and general to be of real assistance with problems arising in the 
inevitable context of future space colonization. 142 
VI. CONTINUING PROGRESS AND THE LEGAL FUTURE: A NEW 
INTERNATIONAL SPACE ORGANIZATION AND CRIMINAL JURISDICTION 
Since static language and treaties cannot be easily modified or used 
as the basis for adjudication, some commentators have argued for the 
establishment of an international agency exclusively dedicated to ad-
dressing and resolving the issues connected with space stations and 
planetary settlements. 143 "In order to serve the needs of the space age," 
one commentator has written, "an [international space] organization 
undoubtedly must possess the power to formulate legal principles, 
standards and rules. It also must be endowed with the power to manage 
or supervise, on behalf of the international community, a number of 
practical events and activities. "144 Creating such an organization and 
giving it these powers is the essential first step towards establishing a 
concrete and satisfactory system for criminal jurisdiction over outer 
space.145 Armed with the legal authority to adjudicate, legislate, and 
supervise, an international space agency would do well to begin with 
the language of the 1988 and 1998 Agreements on criminal jurisdic-
tion, retaining the provisions and principles that are valid and drafting 
new language as needed. 14G 
One of the flaws in both versions of Article 22 is the absence of any 
language specifying who is to serve as arbiter in the event that two 
partner countries entitled to exercise jurisdiction both wish to do SO.147 
An international space agency would be the obvious choice for such 
arbitration. 148 Language as overbroad as that in the 1988 Agreement 
must be avoided: no one country should be entitled to extra jurisdic-
tion such as was given to the U.S. under that Article 22, because such 
special grants go against the spirit of international cooperation that 
informs the ISS project. 149 In formulating new guidelines for the exer-
142 See 1988 Agreement, supra note 6, art. 22; 1998 Agreement, supra note 6, art. 22. 
143 SeeCHRISTOL, supra note 87, at 200; REYNOLDS & MERGES, supra note 37, at 254; DeSaussure 
& Ulrich, supra note 56, at 57. 
144CHRISTOL, supra note 87, at 201. 
145 See id. 
l4°See 1998 Agreement, supra note 6, art. 22; 1988 Agreement, supra note 6, art. 22. 
147 See 1998 Agreement, supra note 6, art. 22; 1988 Agreement, supra note 6, art. 22. 
14R See CHRISTOL, supra note 87, at 20 I. 
149 See 1988 Agreement, supra 1I0te 6, an. 22; Remadls at Signing, supra note 29. 
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cise of criminal jurisdiction, the proposed international space agency 
should rely on more traditional principles, like those embraced by 
other portions of the 1988 and 1998 Agreements. 150 
Territoriality and nationality are among the oldest bases for criminal 
jurisdiction, and the most intuitive. 151 Since previous international trea-
ties prevent any country from claiming the moon or other planets as 
their territory, the international agency entrusted with developing laws 
of criminal jurisdiction in outer space would be well-advised not to 
utilize territoriality as a basis for new legislation.152 The change from 
the 1988 Agreement, which allowed for jurisdiction based on territori-
ality over provided elements, and the 1998 Agreement, which did not, 
may indicate that drafters came to see the eventual problems in its 
application. 153 Nationality theory, however, poses no such problems, at 
least not in the foreseeable future. 154 Astronauts sent into outer space 
as part of future experimental missions will presumably retain the 
nationality of their earth country, as the crew members of the ISS do. 155 
Until such time as the human presence in outer space includes persons 
actually born there, nationality could continue to be one satisfactory 
basis for criminal jurisdiction, just as it has been in the equally non-
territorial area of the high seas. 156 
The second basis for criminal jurisdiction in outer space that an 
international space agency should adopt is the passive personality 
principle, so that a nation may exercise jurisdiction over offenses in 
which one of its nationals was the victim.157 The fact that jurisdiction 
based on this principle is part of the 1998 Agreement's Article 22 
indicates that even countries like the U.S., which have historically 
rejected this doctrine, are beginning to see its advan tages. 15S It is true 
that extending jurisdiction to the countries of both the alleged perpe-
trator and the victim could lead to a multiplicity of valid jurisdictional 
choices for any given offense, but an international space agency would 
have the power and the resources to decide just such questions and 
150 See 1988 Agreement, supra note 6, art. 22; 1998 Agreement, supra note 6, art. 22; Remarks 
at Signing, supra note 29. 
151 See OLIVER ET AL., supra note 33, at 135, 165. 
152 See Twibell, supra note 56, at 593. 
153 See 1988 Agreement, supra note 6, art. 22; 1998 Agreement, supra note 6, art. 22. 
154 See OLIVER ET AL., supra note 33, at 165. 
155 See 1988 Agreement, supra note 6, art. 22. 
156 See OLIVER ET AL., supra note 33, at 165. 
157 See YOUNG, supra note 7, at 152. 
158 See OLIVER ET AL., supra note 33, at 168. 
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could determine the proper forum; as things currently stand, both 
countries have the right to exercise jurisdiction, but there is no final 
arbiter to determine which will ultimately get to do SO.159 
The nationality and passive personality bases of jurisdiction will 
probably be sufficient for projects like the ISS, especially if an interna-
tional agency is established to resolve conflicts and update the provi-
sions, but that agency will also have to create legislation for larger outer 
space activities like bigger space stations or manned settlements. 160 
When the time for such legislation arrives, criminal jurisdiction based 
on the protective principle and universal interest could be added. 161 
The highly technological nature of huge space station projects means 
that their crews are, theoretically, in a unique position to divulge 
information that might endanger a country's national security, integ-
rity, or sovereignty. Enabling an earthly nation to exercise jurisdiction 
over conduct committed wholly in space that threatens these vital in-
terests is therefore sensible. 162 Similarly, every nation should be granted 
jurisdiction based on universal interest for the heinous crimes in that 
category that take place in space or on other planets. 163 Clearly, the 
offenders will have to be extradited from outer space in order to stand 
trial in whatever terrestrial nation the proposed international agency 
deems appropriate, or possibly even in an international court; the 
agency will therefore need to draft extradition provisions as well, which 
could easily be done by following the lead of the 1998 Agreement's 
Article 22.1G4 
Taken together, the 1988 and 1998 Agreements' Articles 22 demon-
strate a growing willingness on the part of the ISS partner countries to 
compromise particular national principles in order to further the co-
operative goals that the project represents. 165 This willingness must be 
perpetuated to ensure continued cooperation among the world's na-
tions as outer space exploration becomes more advanced and more 
nations become involved. Wi The important research being done on the 
159 See 1998 Agreement, supra note 6, art. 22; CHRISTOL, supra note 87, at 201. 
160 See CHRISTOL, supra note 87, at 201. 
161 See OLIVER ET AL., supra note 33, at 177-78. 
162 See id. 
16~ See id. 
164 See 1998 Agreement, supra note 6, art. 22. 
1W'See id.; 1988 Agreement, supra note 6, art. 22; Remarks at Signing, supra note 29. 
166 See Twibell, supra note 56, at 591. Many Third World countries, although not part of the 
cnrrent ISS project, possess significant space technology and will undoubtedly become players in 
the near future. See id. 
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ISS in the fields of microgravity, life sciences, space sciences, and earth 
sciences, as well as the enormous economic and humanitarian rewards 
that could be reaped through space industrialization and commerciali-
zation, indicate the great advantages of continued progress in the area 
of space exploration. 167 It is therefore imperative that a workable system 
of criminal jurisdiction over the ISS, future space stations like it, and 
eventual manned settlements on the Moon and other planets be de-
veloped now, before the first criminal offense is committed in outer 
space and the need for such a system becomes imminent. 168 An inter-
national space agency is a promising solution to the problem of draft-
ing and implementing such legislation because it will not owe particu-
lar allegiance to any sovereign nation, and because it will thus be able 
to create a unitary law for space inhabitants while preventing the 
conflict of legal regimes on Earth. 169 Such an agency should begin with 
the solid foundation of Article 22, incorporating into its eventual 
criminal jurisdiction provisions the bases of nationality and passive 
personality represented by the 1988 and 1998 Agreements as well as 
the protective principle and the doctrine of universal interest.170 
It was in a State of the Union address that President Reagan first 
announced the idea of an international space station, describing it as 
a project that would "strengthen peace, build prosperity, and expand 
freedom."171 Nearly fifteen years later, after major progress on the 
project and the addition of Russia to its partner countries, President 
Clinton's State of the Union address made reference to the fact that 
the ISS will allow the partner countries to "set sail on an unchartered 
sea oflimitless mystery and unlimited potential. "172 The unprecedented 
goodwill and optimism engendered by the ISS in diplomats and scien-
tists worldwide speaks to the potential of such projects, and the funda-
mental importance of being legally prepared in advance for the tech-
nological breakthroughs that are sure to follow in their wake. 173 
167 See id. at 590-91; The International Space Station, supra note 12. 
168 See DeSaussure & Ulrich, supra note 56, at 57. 
169 See id. 
170 See 1998 Agreement, supra note 6, art. 22. 
m Reagan, supra note 1. 
172William Clinton, State of the Union Address, M2 PRESSWIRE, Jan. 28, 1998, avail1lble in 
LEXIS, News Library, 90 Days File. 
173 See Remarks at Signing. supra note 29. 
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CONCLUSION 
The ISS project, now nearing realization after more than a decade of 
development, represents one of the most challenging scientific ven-
tures ever undertaken. The fifteen partner countries involved have rec-
ognized and furthered a unique spirit of cooperation and diplomacy 
throughout the project's progress, beginning with the 1988 Agreement 
and culminating recently with the revised 1998 Agreement. As the ISS 
has continued developing, the contributions and role of the partner 
countries have shifted somewhat, particularly with the addition of 
Russia to the list of participants. As a result, the criminal jurisdiction 
provisions of the Agreement have changed: the U.S. has ceded the 
special grant of jurisdiction it enjoyed under the 1988 Agreement, and 
the new Article 22 rests squarely on the traditional bases of nationality 
and passive personality. This solid foundation in recognized principles 
of international jurisdiction may indicate a willingness to compromise 
on the part of all partner coun tries, and also the depth of commitment 
to the project as a whole. But no treaty language, no matter how 
egalitarian and carefully drafted, can be sufficient to address the prob-
lems that will inevitably arise when the first criminal offense occurs in 
outer space. Continued colonization and exploration of the extrater-
restrial is a given. Articles 22 of the 1988 and 1998 Agreements show 
what can be accomplished by nations sincerely bent on attaining co-
operation and establishing a workable system for all aspects of future 
space exploration and colonization, including criminal jurisdiction. It 
is therefore imperative to take the next step on Earth before astronauts 
take the next steps in space, and establish an international supervisory 
space agency with the legal knowledge and power to build on prior 
jurisdictional accomplishments and write the basic code for the centu-
ries ahead. 
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